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Book Review

Toward a Common Law for Undercover Investigations- a Book Review of ABSCAM ETHICS:MORALISSUESAND D E C E ~ OINNLAW
ENFORCEMENT.
Edited by Gerald M. Caplan.* Cambridge, Mass.:
Ballinger Press. (1983) 147pp.

Reviewed by Bennett L. Gershman**

In the afterglow of ABSCAM, and the looming shadows of 1984, concerned citizens are searching for emerging trends. Is American society becoming a police state with superficial democratic trappings? Or
are the new secret tactics of the police merely a rational and noncoercive means to secure greater fieedom through more effective crime
control? Questions such as these are being asked with increasing fiequency, and neither the courts, legislators, social scientists, nor moralists have provided answers, much less a coherent framework in
which to analyze the relevant factors or standards for resolution.
Confusion abounds. Consider the following examples.
Ten years ago, allegations of corruption in New York City's criminal justice system led to the appointment of a special prosecutor with
broad and independent powers of investigation. Traditional investigative methods proved ineffective because acts of corruption, such as
bribery, ordinarily do not produce complainants, witnesses, or tangiCopyright O 1984 by Professor Bennett Gershman.
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University National Law Center.
** Visiting Professor of Law, Syracuse College of Law; Professor of Law, Pace
University.A.B. 1963, Princeton University; J.D.1966, New York University Law SchooL
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ble evidence of wrongdoing. The discovery of criminal offenses in this
covert, well-insulated, and mutually protective criminal justice system required ifltration and deception. The investigators devised an
imaginative plan: they created a fictitious crime and subsequent arrest, with undercover agents playing the roles of victim, defendant,
and arresting 0fficer.l The staged arrest proceeded routinely through
the New York court system, tricking judges, court officials, and jurors.
The bait was successful; evidence uncovered implicated several
Efforts to prosecute these
judges and lawyers in acts of ~orruption.~
officials, however, met with furious judicial condemnation. The undercover investigation was characterized by shocked courts as "foul,
illegal and outrageous,"3 and "a perversion of the criminal justice
~ystem."~
Clearly, although the end may have been laudable, the
means were unjustifiable.
Four years later, without specific allegations of corruption against
any government official, federal law-enforcement officials launched a
massive undercover investigation into legislative corruption. Code
named ABSCAM,S the investigation was designed to test the honesty
and integrity of high governmental officials by manufacturing opportunities for their corruption. Undercover agents, assisted by a career
swindler, pretended to be representatives of wealthy Arab sheiks
who sought friendship and assistance from public officials in return
for payment of huge bribes. Aided by corrupt intermediaries ignorant
of the scam, roving undercover agents were able to lure several prominent congressmen in front of hidden cameras and ensnare them in
corrupt transactions. The courts overwhelmingly endorsed the opera1. For a discussion of this case, and the use of staged arrests generally, see
Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the Staged An-est, 66 M m .L. REV.
567 (1982). As Special Assistant Attorney General in the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the State of New York from 1973 to 1976, I investigated and prosecuted several
corruption cases employing undercover techniques. In these prosecutions, one of the
principal issues litigated was the propriety of such techniques.
2. A similar investigation, "Operation Graylord," was recently conducted in Chicago. Staged arrests and undercover agents posing as corrupt prosecutors and judges
were used to uncover extensive corruption within the criminal justice system. Several
judges
- and lawyers have already been indicted. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15.1983, at Al, coL 1.
3. Rao v. ~ a d j a r iNo.
, 75 ~ i v2376
.
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,1975); Rao, Jr. v. Nadjari, No.
75 Civ. 2377 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30. 1975).
4. ~ i g r o n ev. ~urta-gh,46 ~ . ~ : 2343,
d 347, 362 N.Y.S.2d 513, 517 (1974), affd, 36
N.Y.2d 421, 330 N.E.2d 45, 369 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975). For a similar condemnation, see
United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.) (government's instigation of bribery by a local assistant district attorney through the use of a staged arrest
went beyond any proper prosecutorial role).
5. The word is an acronym combining the Arst two letters of Abdul Enterprises,
Ltd., a fictitious Middle Eastern corporation, and the word "scam," a slang expression
for a swindle or confidence game. The Federal Bureau of Investigation originally created the organization in 1978 as a front to receive stolen property. In 1979, the FBI
shifted its focus to that of uncovering political corruption, flrst in New Jersey, then
among the members of Congress. See, e.g, Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the
Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALELJ. 1565,1571-75 (1982).
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tion.6 As one typical appellate panel observed:
Given the special relationship between the public and those who
serve the Government, it is inevitable that the public will call for,
and law enforcement officials will rely upon, special investigative
techniques to uncover insidious corruption. Modern crime fighting
methods such as videotapes and carefully devised and supervised
covert investigations often are the only means of discovering
breaches of the fundamental mandate of one's ~ f f i c e . ~

Needless to say, the contrasting judicial responses to these two undercover investigations raise extremely complex and troubling questions. Were the two investigations so dissimilar as to evoke such
markedly dissimilar reactions? Is sneaking under judicial robes any
less indispensable to discoveringjudicial corruption or any more justifiable than sneaking into congressional chambers to discover legislative corruption? Were both undercover operations, and others like
them, regardless of their success, so unreasonable and unfair, and
their implications so frightening as to deserve condemnation not only
legally, but also &om an ethical, social, and political standpoint as
well?
Covert police tactics, while seemingly inconsistent with a democratic society, have long been used in American law enforcement
without significant criticism.* Recently, however, such tactics have
been subjected to sustained attack and have evoked a much more
focused and less visceral reaction. Several reasons may account for
this change. First, covert law-enforcement operations are no longer
directed only against narcotics peddlers, gamblers, or organizedcrime figures, but are now being aimed at persons of wealth, social
Although indignation at this new
prestige, and political pr~minence.~
direction may be spurred in part by class biases, such operations
may also provoke latent fears that, like our ancestors in the Garden
of Eden, no one is completely impervious to seductive temptations.
Second, the dramatic increase in the use of undercover methods and
the increasingly imaginative forms of the deception heighten the anxiety that areas of society and personal relationships previously perceived as sanctuaries of confidentiality might become the next
6. See United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 264
(1983); United States v. Williams, 705 F 2 d 603 ( 2 6 Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 524
(1983); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 2437
(1983); United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103S.Ct 78 (1982);
United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106
(1982).
7. United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 78
(1982).
8. See, e.g, Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and
Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALEL J . 1091,1091-96 (1951); Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L REV.245,245-47 (1942). American law-enforcement authorities have used undercover tactics for over a century to enforce a variety of
laws, such as those regarding immigration, Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th
Cir. 1915);gambling, State v. Torphy, 78 Mo. App. 206 (1899); bribery, People v. Mills, 91
AD. 331.86 N.Y.S. 529, a f d , 178 N.Y. 274,70 N.E. 786 (1904); obscenity, Grimm v. United
States, 156 U.S. 604 (1895); vice, State v. Dingman, 232 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. 1950); and liquor,
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
9. See Wilson, The Changing FBI - The Road to Abscatn, 59 PUB. INTEREST 3
268 (1982).
(1980); S. BOK, SECRETS
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targets for infiltration.1° Third, the development of new and sophisticated technologies for surveillance and information gathering generate fears that these devices will permit broader and more intensive
intrusions into personal privacy than ever before.11 Finally, the absence of significa~tlegal restraints on police undercover activities
raises serious concerns about the potential for abuses of power. Although the fourth and fifth amendments empower the courts to exercise some control over traditional investigative procedures, such as
arrests, searches, and interrogations,12 which usually are conducted
without deception, these controls often do not apply to undercover
investigations, which rely on secrecy for their success. Moreover, the
entrapment defense offers little protection against the government's
ability to instigate crimes, particularly when those persons instigated
have demonstrated some predisposition toward criminal behavior.13
Except for an absolutely shocking case, law-enforcement officials'
ability to use infiltration, manipulation, and deceit to investigate, and
even to manufacture crime, is largely unfettered by judicial
controls.14

ABSCAM Ethics: Moral Issues and Deception in Law Enforcement l5
is a significant contribution to the public debate over the propriety of
undercover tactics in criminal investigations. The book arose out of
two conferences on deceptive law-enforcement techniques and police
ethics held at Harvard University in 1981 and at the John Jay College
of Criminal Justice of the City University of New York in 1982. The
high level of debate at these conferences prompted the Police Foundation to ask Professor Gerald M. Caplan of The George Washington
University National Law Center to assemble and edit the best papers
10. The rate of increase in the FBI's use of undercover operations is staggering.

From 1978 to 1981, the FBI initiated approximately 1,200 separate undercover operations. By contrast, beginning in 1972 the FBI conducted on the average only about 50
undercover operations a year. American Civil Liberties Union, The Lessons of ABSCAM 4 5 (Oct. 10, 1982) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited as ACLU Report]. The budget for such operations also increased dramatically, from $1 million in
1977 to $4.8 million in 1981. Marx, W?w Really Gets Stung? Some Issues Raised by the
New Police Undercover Work, in ABSCAM E m c s : MORALISSUES
AND D E C E ~ O
INN
LAW ENFORCEMENT,
66 (G. Caplan ed. 1983)[hereinafter cited as ABSCAM ETHICS].
PRIVACY
ANI) FREEDOM
(i967). See also Hoffa v. United
11. See, e.g, A. WESTIN,
States, 385 U.S. 293,317 (1966) (Warren, CJ., dissenting) (The "unbridled use of elecused to invade privacy.
appears to be increasingly
tronic recording equipment.
prevalent in our country today."); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323,341-42 (1966)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ('The aggressive breaches of privacy by the Government increase by geometric proportions.").
MODERN
C m ~PROCEDURE,
t
12. See, e.g, Y. KAMISAR,W . LAFAVE,& J. ISRAEL,
211437,543-665 (1980).
13. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973); Park, The Entrapment
.
REV.163,178 n.44 (1976).
Controversy, 60 0L.
14. See i n f a text accompanying notes 71-81.
15. Supra note 10.

..
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for publication. The result is a collection of seven essays dealing with
the specifics of ABSCAM, the use of informants in law enforcement,
the selection of targets for investigation, strategies for dealing with
victimless crimes, and the social and ethical implications of the new
police undercover operations. The essays vary in their approaches
and methodologies. Several of them are sensitive, enlightening, and
provocative; a few are superficial and dull. Notwithstanding its title,
the book transcends any particular undercover operation and provides a framework for further analysis of one of the most difficult and
controversial issues facing law-enforcement officials today. The book
demonstrates the need for new legal approaches to the problem of
police undercover work, both to ensure fair and rational policies and
to provide safeguards against abuse. One such approach, which I
shall discuss below,16 is to create a new common law for undercover
investigations, based on the overriding public interests in controlling
law-enforcement misconduct and protecting citizens against governmental oppression.
The ABSCAM investigation is chronicled and defended by Irvin B.
Nathan, formerly a deputy assistant attorney general in the Department of Justice and coordinator of the ABSCAM prosecutions.17 I
tend to agree with his assessment that, by every objective standard,
ABSCAM was a huge success. A senior United States senator, six
congressmen, a mayor, and an assortment of other public officials
and attorneys were convicted of corruption, usually with videotaped
evidence of the crime in progress. Every conviction was affirmed on
appeal. One congressman was expelled from office, some resigned,
and others were defeated for reelection. The operation's effect in deterring corruption, though diacult to measure, probably has been
substantial.
In addressing one of the most controversial issues raised by ABSCAM, Nathan denies that prospective defendants were impermissibly targeted: "All of the public officials who became involved in
ABSCAM came into the operation as a result of the representations
and actions of corrupt intermediaries," such as Angelo Errichetti,
mayor of Camden, New Jersey, who provided the FBI undercover
agent with a written list of names of those he alleged were corrupt
federal and state politicians in New Jersey.18 Failure to have pursued
these allegations would have occasioned a scandal and may have provoked the charge of a "cover up." Moreover, FBI operatives were
given careful ground rules designed to thwart unscrupulous middlemen and to eliminate any possibility that a subject would be lured
into criminality without fully appreciating the illegal nature of the
16. See infia text accompanying notes 85-108.
17. Nathan, ABSCAM: A Fair and Eflective Methodfor Fighting Public Corruptim
in ABSCAM ETHICS,
m p r a note 10, at 1.
18. Id at 4. A recent report evaluating the ABSCAM operation, based largely on
congressional testimony, disputes this claim and points to evidence indicating that
ABSCAM operations were seeking out corrupt politicians in New Jersey before Errichetti ever became involved in the operation and before the FBI could reasonably
have suspected a pattern of prior criminal activity. See ACLU Report, supra note 10, at
12-19.
Heinonline - - 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
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transaction.lg
Plainly, the government "set the bait" by having its undercover
agents tell the corrupt intermediaries that they were willing to pay
for political favors. But, Nathan argues, the government did not know
who would bite and made no effort to push the bait toward any particular individual. He suggests that ABSCAM resembled common undercover investigations into urban crime in which police in "granny
squads" disguise themselves as elderly women with handbags visible
and ready to be snatched. The entrapment defense was rarely invoked, Nathan observes, probably because it would have been "farfetched" to suggest that sophisticated public officials were so
impressionable as to be enticed into doing something they would
otherwise not be inclined to do.20
Acknowledging that every law-enforcement procedure, not just the
ABSCAM operation, is subject to abuse, Nathan calls for reliance on
the basic integrity and decency of prosecutors and investigators, following elaborate administrative guidelines,2l under close judicial
scrutiny, and aided by vigilant defense counsel. The "good news, at
least for law-abiding citizens," he concludes, is that sophisticated undercover operations to combat crime "represent the wave of the
future."22
Two of the major issues in ABSCAM- the use of informants and
the selection of targets - figure prominently in the book. Peter
Reuter, a senior economist at the Rand Corporation, focuses on inforBecause of the public's
mants, the "dirty secret" of police
high expectations of police performance, some police, Reuter claims,
have entered into long-term relationships with informants, whose
frequent criminal behavior is tolerated, and even permitted, on a regular basis. In effect, the police are "licensing criminals," and there is
very little control over this sordid practice. In the enforcement of nar19. These ground rules apparently did not provide s a c i e n t safeguards. The F B I
initially authorized the establishment of bribe-offer meetings with 27 public officials
solely on the basis of representations from middlemen. Although two authorizations
were cancelled, the others were not. Five of the officials never attended such a meeting. Twenty meetings were held but only 12 convictions resulted. Congressman Edward Patton of New Jersey and Senator Larry Pressler of South Dakota declined a
bribe offer in front of the FBI cameras. See United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206,
1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1981),a f d in pa* 692 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1982);ACLU Report, supra note
10, at 6.
20. Nathan, supra note 17, at 13.
21. In the aftermath of ABSCAM, the United States Justice Department and the
FBI issued comprehensive guidelines for undercover operations. See Department of
Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Attorney General's Ouidelines on FBI Undercovw Operations (1981). In an earlier article, I suggested that the protections purportedly provided by these guidelines is illusory. See Gershman, supra note 5, a t 1586
n.lOO.
22. Nathan, supra note 17, at 16.
23. Reuter, Licensing Criminals: Police and Informants, in i n s C A M E m c s ,
supra note 10, at 100-17.

19833

Heinonline - - 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.

171 1983-1984

171

cotics laws, for example, such transactions are commonplace. Indeed,
Reuter's essay recalls my own experiences as a prosecutor in New
York County when, during arraignment proceedings, members of the
police narcotics unit often asked me to intercede with the judge for
the release of an informant recently arrested by another police
squad. On one occasion, I was even approached by federal drugenforcement agents on behalf of a purportedly valuable informant
who was about to stand trial on major kidnapping charges.
Reuter believes that attempts to control this practice by promulgating guidelines or by requiring that informants be registered are of
questionable value. Such controls tolerate broad discretion, are
easily evaded, and can produce more secrecy and diminished control
within police agencies. He does not specify the seriousness of this
problem2*and does not grapple with the overriding moral question of
whether police-licensed crime should ever be tolerated in a free society. Reuter assumes, I think incorrectly, that such a practice is a necessary means justified by a legitimate end, and that "[elither we
must accept the tensions created by the ill-monitored licensing or we
must lower our demands upon the police to apprehend certain
classes of ~rirninals."~~
The problem of informants is considered in a skillful and provocative essay by Sanford Levinson, a professor at the University of
Texas Law School. Professor Levinson presents a constitutional and
ethical analysis of the government's use of informants and the "hidden costs" of infiltration and deceit.26Spies are a product of classical
liberalism, he suggests, enabling a paranoid government to invade
the private lives of those who might be plotting its destruction. Using
as a model the archetypal informant, Judas Iscariot, Professor Levinson offersa typology of informants and develops a concept that might
be termed a morality of betrayal. The first type of informant is the
"snitch," who betrays another's confidence without the disguise of
deceit. Because all relationships are contingent anyway, Professor
Levinson believes an autonomous choice to betray should be
respected, though he does not fully explain what constitutes an "autonomous choice." Certainly, testimony elicited by a grant of immu. ~ ~a lesser degree, neither is a promise of
nity is not a u t o n o m ~ u sTo
leniency to an accomplice in exchange for his or her testimony.28But
what about a person who "snitches" to cunry favor with the government? Is such a choice autonomous? In considering the autonomous
choice to betray, Professor Levinson must also confront the law of
24. He suggests that characteristics of some federal agencies like the FBI and the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) make it unlikely that many agents can enter
into unmonitored arrangements with informants that violate the agencies' rules. I d at

lie

25. I d at 102.
26. Levinson, Under Cover: The Hidden Costs of Infiltration, in ABSCAM ETHICS,
supra note 10, at 43.
27. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450,459 (1979) (such immunized testimony "is
the essence of coerced testimonv").
28. Cf: Napue v. Illinois, 360 C.S.264,267-70 (1959) (promise of leniency may induce
peiuv).
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privileges. He believes that although American law generally is unconcerned with protecting intimate relationships, it does recognize
the existence of legal privileges that seek to protect the intimacy of
certain relationships by barring autonomous choices to betray specfic
confidence^.^^ A second type of informant is the double agent, who
exploits what was once an authentic relationship to induce the reve~
by inlation of secrets. Here, the government initiates t h betrayal
ducing a person to infiltrate the confidence of a friend, neighbor, or
lover to gather incriminating information secretly.30Under this typology, however, the infiltration need not be governmentally engineered
to make it "socially subversive"; the informant just as easily could be
a newspaper reporter who betrays a trust for a story. A third type of
informant presents a wholly false self from the outset. No genuine
relationship ever existed, and the informant must employ deceit to
gain the confidence of the target.31
Types two and three are the "moral equivalent to.
violence,.
indeed torture," in their capacity to destroy private realms of love,
intimacy, and friendship.32 To the extent that persons are unable to
trust "normal appearances," social disorder is created. Paradoxically,
this erosion of trust, quite apart from its moral implications, will
make successful infiltration for purposes of crime control more difficult. The Constitution broadly sanctions spying and deceit, Professor
Levinson observes, notwithstanding the protections of the fourth
amendment. As the Supreme Court repeatedly has stated in authorizing the government's broad license to spy, eavesdropping and betrayal are "inherent in the conditions of human society."33 Some
governmental deception may be defensible, he concludes, particularly where the police spy on persons who have previously expressed
a willingness to engage in criminal activity" Although he does not

..

..

-

29. See, e.g, 8 J . WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE
$8 2285-2396 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The
Supreme Court recently modified the spousal privilege, so that one spouse could not
bar the other from exercising the autonomous choice to betray the spouse's confidence. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,53 (1980). Nevertheless, in most American
jurisdictions, the marital testimonial privilege still protects confidential communications from disclosure even if one spouse voluntarily desires to make such disclosure.
See 8 J. WIGMORE
at $$ 2336-2338.
30. A good example of this type is found in the events giving rise to Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). Edward Partin, a p end and associate of Hoffa, frequently
visited Hoffa while Hoffa was preparing for a federal trial involving violations of the
Taft-Hartley Act. Partin apparently was a paid federal informant, who reported back to
the government agents his conversations with Hofh that disclosed Hoffa's efforts to
bribe members of the jury. Id. at 297-98.
31. The undercover agents in the ABSCAM operation exemplify this type of
informant.
32. Levinson, supra note 26, at 51.
33. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,465 (1963) (Brennan, J. dissenting). See
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293,302 (1966).
34 One such decision which Professor Levinson apparently agrees with is Lewis
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966). An undercover agent, misrepresenting his identity, was invited into defendant's home on two occasions for the purpose of buying
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specifically discuss the issue, I believe Professor Levinson would find
undercover operations like ABSCAM, which involve extensive infiltration to test the morality of government officials, both dehumanizing and socially destructive.
In a surprising denouement, Professor Levinson proposes that the
"private realm of trust and intimacy" should be protected by redressing a constitutional imbalance and removing the protections of
the fifth amendment- "the real villain of the piece9'- as a "trade-off'
for greater fourth amendment safeguards of privacy.35 Apparently he
regards the fifth amendment as the villain because it prevents lawenforcement ofllcials from directly asking a defendant to explain evidence that suggests criminal behavior.36 As a result, the government
is compelled to use techniques such as informants to secure
convictions.
Professor Levinson's attempt to relate the fifth amendment's 'protection against compelled self-incrimination to the use of deception
to gather evidence of crime is problematic. The privilege against selfincrimination does not appear especially relevant to operations like
ABSCAM, in which all the incriminating statements were obtained
secretly, or to any other undercover investigation of organized crime
or official corruption. The defendants in these cases are usually sophisticated and knowledgeable in the law, and have high-priced lawyers to protect their rights. They are unlikely to make the type of selfincriminating statements protected by the fifth amendment. Yet the
poor and uneducated, who are usually arrested for traditional street
crimes, would be severely disadvantaged by this "trade-off' because
they are more easily induced to incriminate themselves. Professor
Levinson's proposal is risky, as he himself acknowledges. Relinquishing the right to silence on the assurance of enhanced safeguards of
privacy might constitute the ultimate betrayal of all.
The problem of selecting the target of undercover operations is discussed by Lawrence W. Sherman, director of research for the Police
Foundation and professor of criminology at the University of Marydrugs. No reasonable expectations of privacy can be grounded upon such representations of criminal behavior, Professor Levinson believes. He would caution, however,
that for such undercover activity to be permissible the prospective conduct must generally be accepted as criminal, and the undercover agent must learn nothing more
about the person than his or-her continued willingness to violate the law. Levinson,
supra note 26, at 55. Nevertheless, is there not a distinction of constitutional magnitude between a householder who invites a friend into his home, clearly taking the risk
that the friend will "snitch" (Levinson's Type I informant) and law-enforcement conduct that actively "plants" an agent inside the person's home to secure incriminating
evidence (Levinson's Type III informer)? See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323,347
(1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); infia text accompanying notes 99-102.
35. Levinson, supra note 26, at 59.
36. Id. Cf: Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)(fifth amendment forbids
both comments by the prosecutor on the accused's silence and instruction by the court
that silence is evidence of guilt). Several eminent scholars and jurists also believe that
the privilege against self-incriminationhas outlived its usefulness, but for reasons different h m those of Professor Levinson. See 7 J. BENTHAM,THEWORKSOF JEREMY
BENTHAM
445-49 (1843); Wigmore, N m Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV.L REV. 71,
85-86 (1891); Friendly, The FiifM Amendment Tomorrow: The Case For C o n s t i t u t i o ~ l
Change, 37 U. CIN. L REV.671, 671-72 (1968).
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land.37He begins by describing the class bias inherent in traditional
law-enforcement techniques which target the poor and minority
groups in the investigation of street crimes. By contrast, "proactive"
undercover methods -the currently fashionable term for police tactics seeking to prevent certain crimes -are more often aimed at persons of wealth and high social status. "Deception is the only way to
even up the score between the rich and the poor criminals," Professor Sherman believes.38 Yet, although no moral outrage is exhibited
when deceptive techniques are applied to drug pushers or organizedcrime figures, quite the opposite reaction occurs when persons of
wealth or political prominence are exposed to undercover investigations. Such operations, including ABSCAM, often are characterized
as witch hunts, fishing expeditions, or political vendettas. To allay
such criticism, to make target selection more equitable, and to increase law-enforcement productivity, Professor Sherman proposes a
radical procedure to select targets fairly. Rather than selecting individual targets based on an inductive method of tips or leads, which
often produces a biased sample and results in wasteful efforts (although he offers no empirical evidence for these conclusions), Professor Sherman proposes selecting identifiable groups deductively,
based on the probability that some members of this group are committing crimes, and then launching an investigation against randomly
selected members of the group. Indeed, this is precisely the process
used by law-enforcement officials when they establish roadblocks to
catch intoxicated motorists, customs checkpoints to intercept drug
trafiickers, or random audits of income tax returns.39 Professor Sherman's unusual three-point proposal includes: the promulgation of the
investigative plan through administrative rulemaking to give affected
groups an opportunity to debate the proposal; the articulation of explicit criteria for selecting crimes and population groups, such as
numbers of lives lost, or degree of threat to democratic government;
and the provision of proper notice to the target groups (personal Ietters or public advertisements) that they might be exposed to deceptive investigations. The disadvantages of his plan, Professor Sherman
concedes, are both a sacrifice of the element of surprise and the d B culty of defining target groups in sufficiently general categories. On
the other hand, he maintains that deductive target selection would
have a significant deterrent impact, would be more productive than
traditional methods of target selection through tips or leads, and
would be ethically superior because it would remove any stigma from
37. Sherman, From Whodunit to W?LODoes It: Fairness and Target Selection in De, ~ 10,
~ ~at ~118.
ceptive Investigations, in ABSCAM E T H I C S note
38. Id. at 121.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606,607 (1977) (customs checkpoint
search); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,893-94 (1975) (vehicle checkpoint search).
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people who are tested and commit no crime.*
Professor Sherman's proposal, while imaginative and provocative, is unrealistic. What do law-enforcement authorities do with
Errichetti's list of corrupt public officials? Throw it in the lottery? Assuming the existence of a desire to investigate the judiciary based on
allegations of corruption, isn't it unrealistic to expect self-interested
judges or attorneys to participate in a public debate over whether
they should be randomly selected for corrupt overtures? Are there
not ethical and social, to say nothing of constitutional, problems inherent in using factors like race or gender in selecting classes to be
in~estigated?~~
The problem of structuring undercover investigations to maximize
effectiveness and minimize intrusiveness is discussed by two of the
authors. Neither of these essays is particularly enlightening. Mark H.
Moore, professor of criminal justice policy at Harvard University's
Kennedy School of Government, offers a somewhat turgid analysis of
law-enforcement strategies for dealing with so-called "invisible"
crirnesP2 Detection of offenses such as public or political corruption,
narcotics trafficking, and organized crime usually requires law-enforcement officers to position themselves in strategic locations to observe and report the offenses. Such enforcement efforts, however, are
likely to be dominated by the most intrusive undercover techniques,
including extensive and intensive surveillance, targeting of specific
individuals, coercion of witnesses, use of informants and undercover
agents, and instigation and entrapment into committing crimes. The
challenge to the government, Professor Moore argues, is to develop
new and possibly unconventional strategies to attack effectively invisible offenses, while simultaneously protecting the important social
values of privacy, investigative rationality, fairness, and economic efficiency. Yet, Professor Moore insists it is premature to formulate
general policies governing the use of undercover techniques, and that
society should resist the temptation to regulate their use without sufficient and systematic experimentation, documentation, and analysis.
He argues that policies and legal rules governing undercover activities should not be developed in the courts through "ambiguous constitutional principles" but, rather, in administrative agencies and "in
the more ambiguous realm of social policy where diverse values comAccording to Professor Moore, the
pete without a clear hierar~hy."~~
development of policies in this area should be considered primarily
an administrative problem whose solution might have constitutional
40. Sherman, supra note 37, at 125-29.
41. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,728 (1969) (detention for interrogation and
fingerprinting based on race violates the fourth amendment absent probable cause);
Oyler v. Boles, 368.U.S. 448 (1962)(selective enforcement of statute enhancing punishment for habitual criminals does not violate equal protection as long as the selection is
not deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard such as race or religion). One
should note the increasing use of police "profSles" of suspected criminals as an investigatory tool, particularly in narcotics investigations. See United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544,564-65 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 103 S.Ct. 1319,1322 (1983).
42. Moore. Invisible Offenses:A A h a l l m e to Minimallu Intrusive Law Enforce.merit, in ABSCAM ~ ~ n r c < s u p rnote
a 10, at"17.
43. Id. at 18.

.,
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implications. The policy-making agency should represent broad social interests in civil liberties, fair law enforcement, and justice, and
should be allowed to experiment "so that we can find out what is really at stake, and base our policies on experien~e."~~
I am far less sanguine than Professor Moore that agencies such as
the FBI and the Justice Department will be suEiciently sensitive to
values of personal liberty. Nor do I believe that the development of
rules for undercover operations realistically can or should take place
outside the legal system, particularly if the consequences to those
victimized by Professor Moore's "experiments" can be so draconian.
Although empirical analysis might be able to demonstrate whether
operations like ABSCAM really are effective in curbing corruption
and are "cost-efficient," values like privacy and the ability to trust
%orma1 appearances" are not as easily quantifiable. Society does not
need more "experiments" to "find out what is at stake." Most Americans realize what is at stake; the question is whether society is willing to pay the price.45
Wayne A. Kerstetter, a former police official in New York and Illinois, and presently a professor of criminal justice at the University of
Illinois at Chicago, offers his "administrative perspective" of undercover investigations.* It is superficial and banal. He asserts that an
administrator must make tough decisions, balance competing social
interests, look to potential costs, and proceed cautiously. Professor
Kerstetter merely restates the obvious without providing any deeper
understanding. His conclusion is equally unenlightening: "Ultimately
the consequences of using deception must be balanced against the
consequence of not using it."47
By contrast, Gary T. Marx, a professor of sociology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, provides a sensitive, provocative,
and disturbing essay, discussing the social implications of the new
police undercover work48 Issues raised by recent undercover adventures like ABSCAM, Professor Marx claims, go far beyond simply
whether a particular official was predisposed to take a bribe. Rather,
they relate to whether the vastly more intrusive undercover techniques used today signal the emergence of a "totalitarian fortress."49
Professor Marx documents the upsurge in both the nature and scale
of covert law-enforcement activities over the last fifteen years, the
sharply increased funding for such operations, and related lawenforcement innovations such as strike forces and witness-protection
44. Id. at 39.
45. Id.
46. Kerstetter, Undercover Investigations: An Administrative Perspective, in ABSCAM ETHICS,
supra note 10, at 135.
47. Id. at 145.
48. Marx, supra note 10, at 65.
49. Id. at 96.
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programs.50 One of the principal reasons for this change, he suggests,
is the constitutional restrictions on law-enforcement officers' ability
to acquire evidence and the consequent development of imaginative
methods to circumvent these restrictions through informants, government agents, infiltration, and electronic s~fveillance.~~
There is good reason for the public and press to be pleased with
these new police operations. The tactics have proved effective, conviction rates are high, street security may be increased through the
knowledge that anyone may be a police officer, and the courts have
endorsed the techniques. Yet, because secrecy surrounds these operations, the public's perception may be distorted. Little is known
about the mistakes, abuses, and costs of these operation^.^^ Professor
Marx dissects the problematic aspects of undercover police work, observing that American police, in contrast to those in many European
countries, are permitted broad latitude in generating conditions for
crime, in fashioning integrity tests of public and political officials, and
in undermining a target's free will through trickery, coercion, and seductive temptations. Professor Marx also comments on the adverse
effects on the police undercover agents, detailing the severe social
and psychological consequences that can result from "playing the
crook"53He discusses the dangers of informants,"the weakest link in
the undercover system," and the abuses stemming from their illegal,
crime-provoking, and manipulating a ~ t i v i t i e s .Professor
~~
Marx is
most effective in describing the harm to innocent third parties from
undercover operations. Although much of this harm may never be
realized, a good deal is known about the crimes committed by informants, the trauma of victimization, the effects on small businesses of
competition from proprietary fronts run by the police, harmful publicity, and the human suffering from misplaced t r U ~ t . ~ ~
Moreover, how do we measure the effectiveness of undercover operations? Do such operations decrease crime? Or do they cause more
crime than otherwise would be committed? Who is being arrested?
Are they &st-time offenders or habitual criminals? Are they incompetent offenders or experienced criminals? Research is limited, and

-

50. Id. at 66. See ACLU Report.. suDra note 10. at 56.
51. Ma- supra note 10, a(68.
52. Undercover flascos occasionally come to light. In "Operation Frontload" for

example, the FBI investigated organizGd crime in &e const6ction industry by using
an insurance expert in an undercover role. In seeking his certification, the FBI represented him to the insurance company as a "straight arrow," when they knew full well
that he had a criminal record and had agreed to become an informer to avoid serving a
nine-year prison sentence. In the course of his work, he obtained over 800,000 in fees
and issued worthless insurance "performance bonds" to construction companies, costing these companies and insurance brokers more than $60 million in business losses.
No indictments resulted in this case. N. Y. Times, May 18,1979, at Al, coL 1. In another
flasco, entitled "Operation Corkscrew," the FBI sought to investigate corruption by
municipal court judges in Cleveland, Ohio. For this operation, the FBI enlisted one of
the court bailiffs as an undercover agent. The bailiff, however, had other ideas. He induced some of his friends to pretend to be judges and to accept bribes. The bailiff
pocketed $85,000 of the bribe money, until the FBI inadvertently became aware one
year later that it had been "stung!' Wall St. J., Oct. 28,1983, at 1, coL 1.
53. Marx, supra note 10, at 78.
54. Id. at 80-83.
55. Id at 83-86.
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its conclusions are not very definitive. Professor Marx concludes that
ABSCAM may be a portent of the subtle and perhaps irreversible
changes in social control in this country. By secretly gathering information and facilitating crime under controlled conditions, the police,
like the modern corporation, may be able to manipulate our demand
for their services. Such a market, Professor Marx warns, is subject to
exploitation and misuse by the indiscriminate use of undercover operations. American society is fragmented enough without the government adding new layers of repression, suspicion, and distrust. There
is a need, Professor Marx says, for careful analysis and public debate
as to whether these new methods of law enforcement are benign or
malignant.56

111
ABSCAM Ethics does not contain any new or startling revelations
about excesses in law-enforcementinvestigations. Society has known
for some time of the increasing reliance by the FBI and other lawenforcement agencies on espionage, idtration, and deceit. Society
has also been made aware of the "dirty secret" of informants, of the
inequitable targeting of potential criminals, of the modern developments in electronic eavesdropping and other forms of surveillance
and information gathering, of the ability of law-enforcement agencies
to create new crimes and spawn new criminals, and of the passivity
of the courts in controllinglaw-enforcement excesses. But in addition
to providing a useful and comprehensive restatement of these
problems, the book provides some unusual ethical and social perspectives often missing from previous discussions, notably those
found in the essays by Professors Levinson and Marx. And to the extent that ABSCAM Ethics demonstrates the absence of principled
and meaningful norms to limit excesses of law-enforcement power, it
can provide a catalyst to thoughtful discussions regarding the establishment of such norms. As a contribution to this dialogue, in order to
provide a more coherent framework in which to analyze the central
issues, I propose to outline what I perceive as an emerging common
law to control undercover police behavior.
It should be emphasized at the outset that law-enforcement agencies already enjoy tremendous latitude and flexibility in investigating
covert offenses without the need to resort to manufactured crimes or
integrity tests. In investigating an offense that has been or is likely to
be committed, law-enforcement agencies always can employ traditional investigative techniques which rely on witnesses, tangible
proof, and visual surveillance for evidence. But if these methods are
unavailable or ineffective, agencies have ample other means to inves56. Id. at 90-96.
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tigate successfully. For example, they can eavesdrop electronically,
admittedly necessitating a judicial warrant to wiretap or plant a
but requiring no warrant to install pen registers;58beepers;59
cameras, with one party's consent;60or to place a hidden microphone
on an agent.61In addition, without the need for any warrant or probable cause, and over claims of privilege, agencies may obtain a vast
; ~ ~ may
array of personal and business records and d o c ~ m e n t sthey
use infiltration, spies, deceit, and informants without any factual
showing whatsoever;63and may use utilize one of the most coercive
law-enforcement tools -the investigating grand jury - to force the
.~~
law-enforcement
disclosure of protected i n f ~ r m a t i o nFurthermore,
agencies have the authority to .use coercive measures such as grants
of immunity to compel testimony:65they may engage in other conced~ ~ may exedly illegal investigative tactics to obtain i n f ~ r m a t i o nand
ploit new and far-reaching criminal laws like the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (RICO)F7in addition
57. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,354-56 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 55-56 (1967).
58. smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,745-46 (1979).
59. United States v. Knotts, 103 S.Ct. 1081,1087 (1983) (use of beeper to electronically track a moving vehicle not a fourth amendment search). But see United States v.
Cassity, 631 F.2d 461,464-65 (6th Cir. 1980) (warrantless use of beeper to track persons
in their homes violated fourth amendment).
60. United States v. Alexandro, 675 F2d 34,37 n.11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct.
78 (1982).
61. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
62. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,446 (1976) (examining financial records);
Fisher v. United States. 425 U.S. 391,396-98 (1976) (examining records in possession of
attorney). In response to Miller, Congress enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630,92 Stat. 3641,3697 (codified at 12 U.S.C. $83401-3422 (1982)),
which requires that the customer be notified of law enforcement's desire for the information and his right to challenge it in court, unless the government obtains a "protective order" by showing that such notice would seriously jeopardize the investigation
63. Ample support for this proposition is provided by the famous 1966 trilogy of
Hoffav. United States, 385 U.S. 293,311, Osborn v. United States 385 U.S. 323,331-32, and
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-11. See the ABSCAM decisions cited supra
note 6.
64. The grand jury's vast inquisitory powers accord with the oft-stated principle
that "the public has a right to every man's evidence." United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683,709 (1974) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,668 (1972)). The powers of the
nd jury to compel testimony, and the lack of constitutional safeguards to witnesses,
g e been emphasized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188-90 (1977); United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 178-80 (1977);
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,571,580-84 (1976). For a discussion of the use
of the grand jury's broad investigatory powers to trap witnesses into perjury, see
Gershman, The Perjury n a p , 129 U. PA. L REV.624 (1981).
65. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564,575 (1976). As to the scope of immunity conferred, see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441.448-58 (1972). For a discussion of immunity laws and procedures generally, see Gershman, supra note 64, at 648
n.91.
- 66. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (government's deliberate violation
of a third party's fourth amendment rights does not bar the use of illegally seized evidence against defendant); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (government may
use in .IRS civil assessment proceeding evidence illegally seized from defendant);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (illegally seized evidence may be used
before grand jury).
67. 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968 (1976). Parts of this important chapter of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970. Pub. L.No. 91-452.84 Stat. 922. have been favorablv ~ a s s e d
upon by the Supreme court. See United states v. G k e t t e , 452 U.S. 5% 11981);
Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983).
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to the broad conspiracy doctrine.68These powerful weapons, though
open to considerable abuse, have proved extremely effective, in investigating and prosecuting not only narcotics offenses and organized
crime, but also white-collar crime and political c o r r ~ p t i o n . ~ ~
Law-enforcement authorities have not, however, been completely
satisfied with these techniques. To "prevent" crime before it occurs,
law-enforcement agencies have entered into the crime business, establishing, supplying, and even directing a huge array of illegal enterprises, including the manufacture of bootleg whiskey?O drug
manufacturing and distribution, 71 ~ounterfeiting?~
the operation of
and sellillegal bars and restaurant^?^ fencing stolen rnerchandi~e?~
ing fraudulent insurance.75They have committed crimes76and instiand
gated others to commit crimes by using violenceyV
intimidation and deceit.79They have lured into criminality persons
who are weak and inexperiencedFOas well as former offenders who
have tried to reforms1In reviewing these tactics, the courts have only
rarely intervened.
68. 18 U.S.C. 5 371 (1976). As Learned Hand observed in an oft-stated passage, conspiracy is "the darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery." Harrison v. United States,
7 F.2d 259,263 (2d Cir. 1925). The awesome scope of the conspiracy doctrine was also
noted by Justice Jackson, concurring in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,44558 (1949).
69. The tremendous inroads made by law enforcement against organized crime
have been recently reported. See U.S. O m a l s Cite Key Successes i n War Against Oranized Crime, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7,1983, at Al, col. 1. Moreover, the government has
teen extremely successful in recent years in prosecuting public officials without having to resort to scams and integrity tests. These include high federal officials; state
governors; federal and state legislators and local councilmen; and a wide assortment of
other public and political officials. Id.
70. See Green v. United States, 454 F.2d 783,78486 (9th Cir. 1971).
71. See United States v. Wgg,588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978). See also United States v.
Tobias, 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981). cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982) (government operated chemical supply house for distribution to narcotics operations).
72. United States v. Gonzales, 539 F.2d 1238, 1239 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027,
1027-28 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 936 (1973).
73. Chaney v. Department of Law Enforcement, 74 Ill. App. 3d 424,393 N.E.2d 75
(1979), a r d , 82 Ill. 2d 289,412 N.E. 2d 497 (1980).
74. United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also United
States v. Sam Goody, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)(FBI established retail record store which purchased counterfeit records as part of an undercover investigation
of such counterfeiting).
75. See supra note 52.
76. United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1980) (commission of over forty
burglaries); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973) (perjury, forgery, and
Aling false instruments); People ex rel. Difanis v. Boston, 92 Ill.App. 3d 962,416 N.E.2d
333 (1981) (soliciting prostitution).
77. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511,406 N.Y.S.2d 714,378 N.E.2d 78 (1978).
78. United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179 (1st Cir 1977), cert. h i e & 434 U.S. 1075
(1981).
79. United States v. Hinkle, 637 F.2d 1154 (7th Cir. 1981).
80. United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108
(1982); United States v. Wgg, 558 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
81. United States v. Ordner, 554 F.2d 24 (2d Cir 1977). cert. denie& 434 U.S. 824
(1977).
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I have previously suggested several legal methods of controlling investigative excesses. One would be to require a warrant from a magistrate before certain types of undercover investigations could be
conducted.82A second method would be to eliminate some of the vagaries in making due process determinations of undercover operations by providing a detailed set of criteria to serve as g ~ i d e p o s t sA. ~ ~
third method would be to provide a broad entrapment statute that
focuses not on the subjective predisposition of the defendant, but
rather on law-enforcement officers' conduct, which would be evaluated in terms of its reasonableness, fairness, good faith, and resulting
harm.84
All of these proposals advance the overriding public policies of protecting citizens against governmental misconduct and misuse of
power.85They incorporate many of the ingredients for a common law
to control undercover police investigations. I envision the shape of
this common law of "investigative misconduct" as emerging from an
amalgam of several distinct legal doctrines and equitable principles.
These doctrines and principles not only are firmly based in jurisprudence, but also are supported by logic and morality. Such a proposal
does not require any radical assertion of the balances of power be. ~ ~the contrary, it netween coordinate branches of g ~ v e r n m e n tOn
cessitates only a modest reassertion of the status and independence
of the judiciary - which the judiciary gradually has abdicated - to
impose meaningful restraints on the law-enforcement activities of
the Executive Branch. In this respect, ABSCAM, quite apart from its
dramatic revelations of the power and effectiveness of undercover police work, has far greater significance because of its impact on our
constitutional form of g~vernment.~'Specifically, ABSCAM has affected the doctrines of entrapment, supervisory powers, due process,
and of the fourth and fifth amendments. The equitable principles that
interact with these doctrines are clean hands, judicial control of lawenforcement excesses, and freedom from governmental oppression.
Entrapment is easily one of the most controversial doctrines in
criminal law because it reflects a deep-seated ambivalence over
whether the defense should focus on the defendant's predisposition
or on the government's investigative tactics.88All courts find it repugnant for law-enforcement officers to lure innocent persons into crime
--

- -

82. See Gershman, supra note 1, at 633-37.
83. Id at 611-33.
84. See Gershman, supra note 5, at 1585-90.
85. Indeed, the roles of principle and public policy as legal forces justifying the
departure from, or the reshaping of established rules, is a historical as well as a pruTAKING
RIGHTSSERIOUSLY
22-28 (1977).
dential fact. See R. DWO-,
86. By way of contrast, such a radical alteration would indeed result from recent
A COMMON
LAW
proposals seeking to broaden the common law. See, e.g., G. CALABRESI,
FOR THE AGEOF S~ATUTES(1982).
87. See Barlow, Entrapment and the Common Law: Is There a Place for the American Doctrine of Entrapment?, 41 MOD.L, REV.266 (1978). Mr. Barlow's analysis, while
confined to the English criminal justice system, lends considerable force to my
arguments.
88. See, in this connection, the majority and concurring opinions in Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435,451 (1932); cJ id. at 45859 (Roberts, J. concurring); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,376-77 (1958).
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through trickery and t e m p t a t i ~ n But
. ~ ~ some judges also find it repugnant for such officers to use unfair tactics to inveigle any person
into crime, regardless of the person's c~lpability.~o
The clean-hands
principle provides the equitable basis for an entrapment doctrine
that focuses on the government's misconduct. It would bar from the
court any party who has violated the law in connection with the
transaction sought to be litigated.g1Law-enforcement tactics that encourage a crime merely to secure a prosecution are improper, and the
government should not be allowed to benefit from such conduct by
gaining a conviction.
Focusing on the fairness of the government's conduct is also the
principal concern of the supervisory-powers doctrine. This doctrine
seeks to preserve the integrity of the administration of criminal justice and to prevent future abuses by providing meaningful standards
on the proper use of law-enforcement powerP2 When law-enforcement officials engage in investigative misconduct, this doctrine authorizes the courts to review and remedy such misconduct,
regardless of whether an explicit constitutional guarantee is implicated. The supervisory-powers doctrine is a modern expression of the
equitable principle of judicial control of police improprieties, such as
the use of tactics designed to instigate rather than investigate
crime.93 Several courts have applied this doctrine in censuring various types of law-enforcement excesses in conducting investigat i o n ~ Regrettably,
.~~
the Supreme Court's admonition against the
judiciary's broad use of a "chancellor's foot vetomg5has not only silenced those courts willing to assume a broad supervisory role, but
-

-

89. See, e.g, Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448.
90. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,496 (1976) (Brennan, J. dissenting);
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436-38 (1973) (Douglas, J. dissenting); United
States v. Jannotti. 501 F. Suuu. 1182.1200 (E.D. Pa. 1980). rev'd 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.).
cert denied, 457 U.S. 110.6 (i682); ~ & t e dstates v. ~elli,'539F: supp. 363,376 (D.D.c:
19821. rev'd 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 264 (1983).
91. see. Olrnstead v. 'united states, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928)' (Brandeis, J,
dissenting).
92. In McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,343 (1943), the Supreme Court provided the theoretical and practical bases for this doctrine:
A democratic society, in which resuect for the dirmitv of all men is central.
naturally guards ag&t the misus; of the law eGorc'?ment process. Zeal in
tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance of soberness of judgment.
Disinterestedness in law enforcement does not alone prevent disregard of
cherished liberties. Experience has therefore counseled us that safeguards
must be provided against the dangers of the overzealous as well as the despotic. The awful instruments of the criminal law cannot be entrusted to a
single functionary.
93. See Barlow, supra note 87, at 281.
94. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423
(1973); United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113,125 (E.D. Ohio 1977), affd 590 F.2d 206
(6th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), rev'd, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d
757, (2d Cir. 1983).
95. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435 (1973).
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also most likely has encouraged more creative and excessive investigative "experiments" by the government.
The due process clause, unlike the entrapment and supervisorypowers doctrines, is a dominant constitutional force to protect the
moral values related to undercover police work, particularly the freedom and integrity of the individual's will from governmental intrusion and decepti0n.9~As such, the due process clause mirrors the
equitable principle that courts will not tolerate governmental oppression, particularly oppression that seeks to undermine an individual's
free will. The Supreme Court has referred to due process limitations
on undercover police conductg7and has acknowledged the relationship between due process and unfair and deceptive government behavior that induces persons to commit crimes.98Due process would
provide the central pillar in a common-law edifice governing undercover conduct. Investigative "fairness" would require examining
many factors, including not only the government's need for the tactic,
but whether the tactic was reasonably suited to the ends sought, and
constituted a fair use of law-enforcement power. In addition, the
kinds of social harms referred to by Professor Marx would be exceedingly relevant in assessing the permissibility of the tactic.
The fourth and fifth amendments represent the final components of
this new doctrine. They hardly are foreign to the jurisprudence of undercover investigations, although they have never been interpreted
to offersignificant protection. The Supreme Court has suggested that
undercover methods that entice persons into crime are as objectionable as coerced confessions and unlawful searches.99But this was in
dictum, and apparently of fleeting significance. Clearly, the fourth
and fifth amendments could offer extensive protection against certain
kinds of undercover activities. The fourth amendment, as a safeguard
against unreasonable intrusions, could be interpreted to provide an
enlarged zone of privacy that law-enforcement officers would not be
permitted to penetrate absent some factually articulable justifications.loOThe Court's treatment of undercover police cases totally obfuscates any rational understanding of notions of privacy and
security. Because one assumes certain risks in ordinary social relationships, should the government be allowed to add to those risks? Is
there any significant difference in terns of privacy between planting
an electronic "bug" and planting a human spy? Should not both
equally require a judicial warrant? The fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination could be construed to embrace incriminating statements induced by the police through subterfuge and deceit,
as well as overt force.lOlAre deceit and physical force really that dif96. See Gershman, supra note 1, at 596-601.
97. Sherman v. United States. 356 U.S. 369.373 (1958).
98. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423; 437 (1959); COX v..huikiana, 379 U.S. 559,571 (1965).
99. Shermap v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,372 (1958).
100. Bovd v. united States. 116 U.S. 616.630 (1886): Osborn v. United States. 385 U.S.
323,340-54-(1966) (Douglas, J.; dissenting), ~ e e ' ~ m s t e r d aPerspectives
m
on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L REV.349,406-07 (1974).
101. The Supreme Court rejected this fifth amendment claim in Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966). However, it might be argued that an undercover
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ferent in their capacity to coerce people to act against their own will?
Deceit is far more subtle, and for that reason is perhaps far more effective than force.102
But one should not construe these two great amendments separately, or as antagonists, as Professor Levinson does.103 For by considering them as mutually protective and reinforcing, rather than in
isolation, an entirely new doctrine emerges.lo4And if combined with
the other important doctrines previously examined, this "penumbra"
provides the principled basis for a new means to analyze covert investigative conduct. Under this new doctrine, law-enforcement authorities' use of deceit and surreptitious intrusion into an individual's
privacy without a judicial warrant or any factual basis for believing
that the target is engaging in crime, for the express purpose of extracting incriminating statements, or ensnaring the target into future
criminal activity, should merit the same judicial censure as do illegal
searches and confessions. Indeed, it is paradoxical that the Court has
been so scrupulous in protecting fourth and fifth amendment rights
even when the violation was largely technical and inadvertent,105and
yet has so steadfastly upheld deliberate, intrusive, outrageous, and
illegal investigative conduct when no right traditionally associated
with the fourth or fifth amendment has been jnfringed.lo6
Applying this common law to undercover investigations would require the courts to weigh values such as rationality, fairness, good
faith, and harm under objective standards. This is not to say, however, that artifice and deception cannot play a significant role in the
investigation of crime or that covert operations cannot be imaginative
and aggressive when directed at important, legitimate, and specific
law-enforcement objectives. But distinctions and limitations must be
made on the basis of reasonableness and fairness. Striking a true balance between governmental power and individual freedom hinges on
such distinctions and limits. For example, establishing a hidden
checkpoint to detect intoxicated drivers may be an acceptable lawagent's pressing persons to talk into a concealed microphone might constitute sufficient compulsion as to implicate this constitutional protection. CJ United States v.
Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 620 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 524 (1983) (although fifth
amendment issue was not raised here, the court did indicate that government's informer had coached defendant as to what he should say at meetings with undercover
agents).
102. S. BOK, LYING18 (1978).
103. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
104. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,630 (1886). (Court recognized that at
times the fourth and fifth amendments "run almost into each other").
105. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,445-46 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443,449 (1971).
v. United States. 425 U.S. 484.490-91 (1976)
106. See suwa note 66. See also H a m ~ t o n
(when defendant is predisposed to &el his constitutionalkghts are not violat'ed by
the police engaging in illegal activity); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 43536
(1973) (when defendant is predisposed to crime, government's act of supplying essential ingredient for illegal narcotics does not constitute entrapment).
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enforcement practice, whereas establishing a checkpoint to detect
expired registrations may not be; having an undercover officer pose
as a potential mugging victim may be an acceptable police tactic,
though having that same officer sprawl out on the pavement with
hundred-dollar bills protruding from his pocket may not be; the undercover purchase of narcotics often is permissible, but establishing
elaborate drug manufacturing operations to attract new criminals or
distributing narcotics into new channels of society is totally impermissible and irresponsible; and spying on persons engaged in, or
about to commit, a crime may be acceptable, particularly when accompanied by judicial authorization, whereas spying on persons not
engaged in present or future crime is not only unacceptable, but is
the kind of insidious activity historically practiced by totalitarian regimes to maintain power.lo7
"The grand purpose of the law is to make business for itself," the
narrator states in Bleak House. lo*Law-enforcement authorities have
more than enough crime-fighting work to keep themselves busy and
have a considerable arsenal of crime-fighting weapons with which to
do this work, without needing to generate new business. While the
press and public may be infatuated today with ABSCAM-like operations and ambitious law-enforcement officials continue to reap headlines through the use of this type of investigation, society must not
become shortsighted about the implications of these techniques.
Once these new undercover experiments take hold and the public becomes conditioned to accept them as legitimate, it will become increasingly more difficult to abolish them.log And by a process of
gradual accretion, American society may be heading toward that "totalitarian fortress" about which Professor Marx warns. ABSCAM Ethics is an important contribution to the type of thoughtful discussion
needed to avoid that result.

107. See H.ARENDT,THEORIGINS
OF TOTALITARIANISM
430-31 (1973).
108. C. DICKENS,
BLEAKHOUSE416 (Riverside ed. 1956).
109. However, as this book review was going to press, a majority of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee attacked FBI
undercover operations and called for legislation to require the bureau to detain judicial warrants before beginning them. N.Y. Times, May 2,1984 at A23,coL 1.
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